Henry Masauko Chipembere on Malawi's Growing Links With Apartheid South Africa

Masauko and Catherine Chipembere Wedding Photo

Malawi's Growing Links with South Africa: A Necessity or a Virtue?
Author(s): Henry B. Masauko ChipembereSource: Africa Today, Vol. 18, No. 2, Independence: The Second Decade (Apr., 1971), pp. 27-47

Malawi's links with South Africa can be said to date back to precolonial times. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ngoni people, one of the component units of what was then the Zulu nation of South Africa, entered Malawi in a number of waves and established their hegemony in various parts of the country, easily subduing the various kingdoms of the then progressively decadent Malawi Confederation. The newcomers were quickly assimilated in blood, language, and culture, but their Zulu family names and place names, as well as their pride in their ancestry have been largely preserved.1 These links have created a great affinity of sentiment with the African people of South Africa, an affinity which in recent times has been reinforced by the rising tide of Pan-Africanism and which finds expression in the deep sympathy which the Malawi people have for their suffering brethren in South Africa.

A less significant ethnic link traceable to the nineteenth century was created by the settlement in the Lower Shire area of Malawi by the Kololo people, an offshoot of the Sotho people of South Africa which had conquered much of what is today southern and southwestern Zambia. David Livingstone had recruited many of his porters from among this people. Sixteen of them decided to settle in Malawi. Since Livingstone had provided them with firearms, they acquired prestige and power and became rulers; they enlarged their stock through polygynous marriages.2
 

The Colonial Period

The colonial period of Malawi's history opens with extensive South African participation. Sir Harry Johnston's expedition sent by Britain to establish British rule over the Malawi people was financed by a 2,000 pound donation from Cecil Rhodes, then premier of the Cape Province of South Africa. Thereafter Rhodes subsidized the financially embarrassed administration of the new British protectorate of Nyasaland (present day Malawi) to the tune of 10,000 pounds annually. In accepting South African aid today, therefore, the new rulers of Malawi are reverting to a pattern set by their colonial predecessors.

One inevitable consequence of this relationship between Rhodes and the protectorate's government was that he exercised considerable influence over the affairs of the territory. Another result was that a number of South African white men were employed in various jobs in the government service. Thirdly it encouraged the flow of South African white hunters, traders, planters, prospectors, and adventurers as well as missionaries - a process which had begun several years before, with the advent of the first European settlers in the land.

The missionaries who came from South Africa were of the ultra-Calvinist Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). By the rules of the missionary game they were allowed a spiritual monopoly of the central districts of Malawi.3 There they preached their traditional racial doctrines in a subtle manner. The black people, they taught, being descendants of Ham, the sinner, had to work harder for their spiritual salvation than other races because it was exceedingly difficult for them to wash themselves clean of their inherited sin.A The DRC missionaries also opposed any significant increase and improvement in educational facilities and encouraged tribal separatism among their preponderantly Chewa congregations. That members of this tribe are among those who have lagged farthest behind in education and that the less enlightened people among them tend to be tribalistic is largely attributable to the work of the South African missionaries.5 It may also account for the great support that some of them give to the present Malawi government's policy of giving moral support to the South African racist regime. The South African missionaries inculcated an attitude of mind which is, to say the least, incapable of becoming indignant at the racist doctrines of South Africa.
 

With these growing links, news of South Africa's great wealth quickly spread in Malawi. Large numbers of Malawians, unable to find jobs in their homelands and consequently unable to pay the newly imposed hut tax, flocked to South Africa and Rhodesia in search of work. The mining firms of South Africa found that such workers from outside the country accepted lower pay and were more amenable to control than indigenous labor. They formed an organization to ensure a steady flow of labor from Central and East Africa. The
Witwatersrand Native Labor Association (WENELA, as the organization was called) offered jobs on a contract basis. A laborer recruited by it was made to work for a stipulated period of time and to return home on leave and "join" again if he so desired6 Part of his pay was deducted and sent back home to his dependents, part of it was kept for him until the end of his contract, and the remainder, a small part, was given to him for minor expenses. Food, clothing, and accommodationw ere provided" free," but were in fact reflected in the low wages he received - often 6 per cent of the pay of a white man doing the same type of work!
 

The influx of workers from Malawi. both those recruited by WENELA and those coming on "Mselfu" (from the words "by himself," i.e., on his own) increased steadily. Thus while in 1946 WENELA recruited 12,750 Malawians 7 by 1961 it was recruiting 31,800 annually8 

An office known as the Office of the Nyasaland Government Representative was therefore established in the South African chief commercial and industrial city of Johannesburg to handle the welfare and immigration problems of Malawians working in that country. The Representative was not a diplomat, but he handled all matters concerning immigration, labor, trade, customs, andinformation. By 1967 there were an estimated 80,000 Malawians working in South Africa, of whom 46,000 had been recruited for contract work on the minesby WENELA.9
 

Throughout the colonial period Britain was the chief exporter to and importer from Malawi. But trade with South Africa was gradually increasing for two reasons. In the first place, Malawi tended to import from South Africa all items which could not be obtained from Britain or could be obtained more cheaply in South Africa, and to export to it most of the agricultural products which Britain was not keen to buy from Malawi. Secondly, during the two world wars when trade routes to and from Britain were not safe some of the trade with Britain was diverted to South Africa.10
 

In the social sphere the only pre-independence relationship worth noting is the fact that Malawi, lacking a university of its own, used to send its African scholarship winners to the Fort Hare University College in the Cape Province of South Africa, as did Zambia and Rhodesia. Many of the leaders of the nationalist movement in all three countries were such Fort Hare graduates. The arrangement did not last long, however, insofar as Zambia and Malawi were concerned, for in 1953 Central and East African students were banned
from studying in South Africa.
 

This then was the general picture in the relationship between Malawi and South Africa in 1961 when Malawi achieved its first stage in self-rule, i.e., when the party of black independence, the Malawi Congress Party, won an overwhelming majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly. The leader of this party at once became the dominant figure in the government of the country. It may be worthwhile at this juncture to digress somewhat and devote a few lines to a description of this leader.
 

Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda
 

Among the many thousands of young Malawians who were attracted to South Africa by the material and other opportunities of that country during the first two decades of this century were three men who were later to become prominent. The first went to South Africa and returned; the second went to South Africa and stayed; the third went to South Africa and proceeded abroad.
 

The first was Eliot Kamwana who became the founder and moving spirit of the Watch Tower (Jehovah's Witnesses) movement in Central Africa. The movement acquired open political and anti-colonialist overtones and Kamwana was exiled to the Indian Ocean islands of Seychelles from where he returned only in late old age. The second man was Clements Kadalie who became the architect and leader of the trade union movement in South Africa and later became, in the words of George Padmore, "the uncrowned King of the black masses. "I The third was Hastings Kamuzu Banda who is now President of the Republic of Malawi.
 

The story of Dr. Banda has been told many times; only the bare outlines.

In 1925, after ten years in Rhodesia and South Africa, Dr. Banda became one of the many beneficiaries of a revival of black American interest in the development of Africa's black people. He came to the United States with a scholarship provided by the African Methodist Episcopal Church's black American Bishop, L. T. Vernon.
 

He went to high school at Xenia, Ohio, and later studied history and political science at Chicago University, and medicine at Meharry College in Nashville, Tennessee (1937). After obtaining his medical degree, he went to Scotland where he worked for medical credentials that would enable him to practice in the British Empire. During the Second World War he practiced medicine in London and it was here that he developed a keen interest in politics. After the war he became active in various anti-colonial movements and became an associate of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, then a law student in London. He also became a founder-member and representative of the Nyasaland African Congress which was formed to fight for Malawi's liberation from colonial rule. He wrote a large number of articles in support of the Congress stand and became widely recognized as a radical African nationalist. In 1953 he moved to Ghana where his personal friend, Nkrumah, had become Chief Cabinet Minister.
 

In Malawi, by 1956, the Nyasaland African Congress began to attract radical young university educated nationalists into its membership and leadership. These young nationalists were dissatisfied with the older leadership which they felt was not dedicated enough to lead a vigorous struggle, nor intellectually well enough trained to hold its own in political arguments and negotiations with European politicians and British government officials. At the 1957 Annual General Conference of Congress they successfully sponsored a
motion asking Dr. Banda to return to Malawi to lead the struggle for independence. No sooner had Dr. Banda arrived in 1958 than the country, already in the throes of political conflict, was engulfed in a series of riots and clashes between Congress supporters on the one hand and armed colonial police and troops on
the other. This situation compelled the British Government to concede self-rule to the people of Malawi who had formed the Malawi Congress Party to replace the now banned Nyasaland African Congress.

With Dr. Banda at the helm, the Malawi Congress Party became the virtual ruler of the country from the day it won a majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly in 1961. External affairs were still a subject reserved for the British Government, as were a few other matters. But Dr. Banda, because of the tremendous support that he and the party enjoyed, was already in a position to influence all policy and to make preparations and arrangements to suit the external policy that the ruling party intended to pursue after achieving complete
independence.
 

Relationship With South Africa After Self Rule

In relation to South Africa, as in the case of relations with all other countries, three alternatives presented themselves before the new rulers of Malawi: they could continue the pattern of relations that the British colonial regime had established; they could decide to weaken or abolish those relations; or they could strengthen them, building on foundations laid by the colonial regime. Dr. Banda, now the country's premier, after a brief period of appearing to move in no direction - a period in which he kept everybody guessing as to
which way he would go - began slowly to make it clear through deeds rather than words that as far as South Africa was concerned, he had opted for the last of the three alternatives, namely, that of establishing stronger ties. It was an about face which jolted many observers as well as his own admirers and supporters. The shock was sharpened by two experiences which stood clearly in people's memories. First, Malawi's struggle had been based on a belief in the equality of human beings and equality of opportunity; but now the party that had led this struggle was seeking to establish friendship with, and thus to give moral support to, a regime that believed in white supremacy and practiced it in its most obnoxious form. Secondly, the election manifesto of that party, for the general election of August 1961 which put the party in power, had promised the people that once in power it was going to participate actively in the struggle for the liberation of other parts of white-dominated Africa, including South Africa. Now the Malawi Congress Party was going to dishonor its election pledge and become the virtual ally of the enemy it had pledged to fight to the bitter end.
 

Africa was surprised but did not lose hope. Everywhere there was faith in the Malawi people's good sense and their ultimate ability to compel their leader to pursue policies which they themselves wanted to see pursued. Malawi's Vulnerable Position
 

That Malawi's geographical position and her economic disabilities imposed certain limits on her freedom to participate in the liberation of southern Africa was widely recognized. Malawi is one of the landlocked countries of Africa. She depends on the Portuguese-controlled Mozambican port of Beira for her outlet to the sea and on a Portuguese railway line for access to that port. Malawi is in fact almost surrounded by Portuguese-ruled territory and therefore highly vulnerable to Portuguese retaliation should she participate in the struggle to remove Portuguese rule from Mozambique.
 

In relation to South Africa and Rhodesia there were two main factors  limiting Malawi's freedom to actively support the African people's struggle. The first was that thousands of Malawians were working there, many under the contract arrangements described earlier. If South Africa or Rhodesia, or both, became hostile and repatriated all Malawian workers, Malawi would be faced with the dangerous problem of what to do with thousands of unemployed roaming the streets of Zomba, Blantyre, and Lilongwe. This would make for a political instability that would jeopardize the country's hard-won independence. The second factor was that as a result of British colonial trade policy Malawi's external trade had for decades been first with Britain but secondly with South Africa and Rhodesia. Many manufactured goods, including drugs and machinery, had for years been imported from South Africa. A sudden rupture in this relationship might cause much hardship in Malawi. These problems were understood and appreciated not only by members of Dr. Banda's cabinet but also by many of the leaders of the other African states, including the more radical ones. When Dr. Banda visited the other African states and explained why Malawi could not be active in the struggle for the liberation of southern Africa he met with nothing but uniform sympathy throughout. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, then President of Ghana, after listening to Dr. Banda's exposition of Malawi's delicate situation remarked, "Dr. Banda do you think I can ask you to cut your own throat?"12 Dr. Nkrumah proceeded to demonstrate his understanding of Malawi's plight by strengthening his old friendship with Malawi. He sent several goodwill missions to Malawi and was the first African head of state to send a diplomat to it.
 

During these pre-independenced ays all explanations of Malawi's difficult position were made in private discussions, but when Malawi became independent in July, 1964, and attended for the first time a summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)i n Cairo, Dr. Banda explained the position publicly. His remarks were essentially the same as those he had made in private, but on this occasion his tone and manner changed; he chose to be "blunt," to borrow his own favorite word. Unsurprisingly, the western press took his remarks as a sign of dissent from the attitude of the other members of the OAU and gave them that wide publicity which they bestow on expressions of dissent from any aspect of Pan-Africanism. However, the basic sympathy of the other members of the organization was not destroyed, as I was to learn from some personal experiences during the first two years after the conference. In 1965 I met a member of the Kenya cabinet who had been present at the Cairo summit meeting. He criticised me and my colleagues who had resigned or been expelled from the Malawi cabinet. He said that Dr. Banda's policy towards South Africa was right and ours wrong because Malawi's position in relation to white-dominated southern Africa was militarily and economically precarious. I had the same experience in Cairo in 1966 when an Egyptian cabinet member who had attended the 1964 summit meeting expressed similar views. In the words of this otherwise deeply radical revolutionary, Malawi "cannot afford to be very progressive."
 

But all the African sympathizers were unanimous on one point, namely, that while Malawi could not afford to destroy her trade and other links with the white-supremacist regimes of southern Africa she should take rapid steps to put herself in a position of less and less dependence on these regimes. She should seek alternative routes and sea ports to her north, especially in Tanzania. Her plans and activities for economic development should be such as wouldc reate internal opportunities of employment, so as to remove or reduce the need for her people to seek work in South Africa and Rhodesia. She should explore possibilities for gradually lessening her trade with the south and for finding new trade partners in other parts of Africa as well as outside Africa.
This is the view that we, the internal critics of Dr. Banda's policies, held. A sudden change, we realized, was impossible, but we felt that a gradual lessening of our country's involvement with the south was possible, and we wanted to see evidence that our leader was moving in this direction. But with each passing day he gave us cause for increasing dismay; far from gradually withdrawing from the south he took steps which could only get Malawi more and more committed to permanent collaboration with white racist minority regimes that were oppressing our own brothers in southern Africa. During Malawi's own struggle for freedom, Dr. Banda himself had always angrily attacked any African government which fraternized with the white supremacist Federal Government of Sir Roy Welensky, from whose federation Malawi was bitterly striving to secede. He had once denounced a Nigerian visiting delegation sent by the late premier Sir Abubakar Balewa for coming as guests of the Federal Government and had boycotted the delegation. We felt that South Africa's black people had every right to feel the same about Malawi fraternizing with South Africa.
 

Milestones in The Development of Malawi's Southward-Looking Policy
 

The first overt indication of Dr. Banda's intention to pursue a policy of stronger links with the minority regimes was given in February, 1962, when he became the first African nationalist leader to pay an official visit to the Portuguese Government in Lisbon. There he met the late dictator Dr. Antonio Salazar and had secret talks with Salazar's minister of foreign affairs. The purpose of the visit and the subject of discussion were never revealed to Dr. Banda's cabinet colleagues or to members of the Central Executive Committee of the Malawi Congress Party. No doubt he went to assure the Portuguese of his friendly intentions and also to get them to promise Malawi continued use of the port of Beira and the railway line leading to and from it. But why did this have to be a secret? Was it necessary for him to pay a visit to Lisbon for the purpose? All matters concerning foreign relations at this pre-independence stage were still being handled for Malawi by Britain. Why was this channel of communication not employed in this case? These were questions which the more politically conscious Malawians were asking and which remained, and indeed, still remain unanswered.
 

The next open move towards the South was made in 1963 when Dr. Banda, then prime minister of a nearly independent Malawi, invited Winston Field, then prime minister of Rhodesia and a leader of the Dominion Party which had come to power by preaching ultra-white supremacism, to come to Malawi on a secret visit. After their secret talks which took place at the residence of the Governor, Sir Glyn Jones, my colleague Kanyama Chiume and I, who were regarded as radicals, were (for reasons I have never been able to figure out with certainty), called to the residence. We were not told what we were being called for but found ourselves being offered drinks and being introduced to the prime minister of Southern Rhodesia. We were most unhappy at being made to meet socially with a man who was refusing to meet with representatives of the
four million Africans in Rhodesia. We could only deduce from this action of Dr. Banda that he expected some criticism from the public and wanted to be able to defend himself by saying, "I was not alone; Chiume and Chipembere too met Mr. Field." A few days later when the news had leaked to the press, Dr. Banda publicly agreed that he had invited and met Winston Field and had found him to be "a decent gentleman" and a man with whom he was prepared to have dealings.

Up until this time and indeed until the coming of independence in July, 1964 there were no open direct contacts with the South African government. All contacts and negotiations were conducted through the British as far as important matters of policy were concerned, while those concerning migrant Malawi workers and trade continued to be handled through the Office of the Nyasaland Government Representative in Johannesburg.
 

But a few months before independence one more significant development occurred. In the spirit of that genuine desire to help Malawi free herself from excessive dependence on railways and ports controlled by the white-minority regimes of southern Africa - a spirit which pervaded the whole of independent Africa - the Government of Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in 1963 offered its port of Mtwara for use by Malawi. It also offered assistance in improving, the road leading to and from it. I participated in the initial talks on this topic and recall the great enthusiasm with which President Julius Nyerere and his ministers made this offer to our country.
 

At about the same time, Tanganyika was discussing with Zambia the possibility of constructing a railway line linking Zambia with the Tanzanian coast, again with the eventual aim of disentangling Zambia from the communications clutches of the south. Dr. Banda suddenly stepped into these latter talks and pressed that the suggested Zambia-Tanzaniar ailway line should pass through central and northern Malawi. Those who are familiar with the geography of Central Africa will easily appreciate how difficult it was for the other two governments to accept the proposition. It would mean making a detour, almost a loop, that would make the line almost three times as long and take that much more time and money to construct. When, quite unsurprisingly, the other two leaders (i.e. Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere) politely rejected the idea, Dr. Banda became indignant. Relations were further "aggravated" when the two presidents held subsequent secret meetings to discuss matters of common concern. Dr. Banda was not invited, whereas on some occasions
President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya was.
 

Dr. Banda angrily declared to us, his colleagues: "They have rejected my sound suggestion, and now they are boycotting me and ganging together against me. Now they will never be able to blame me for facing south towards the white governments and turning away from the rest of Africa. They will have only themselves to blame."13The relish and apparent relief with which these words were said left us in no doubt that the path to the south was the direction in which our leader had all along been keen to move. He had been looking for a
"valid" pretext for this but had found none until this time when Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda, as it were, 'walked into" his trap. Thereafter Dr. Banda pursued a policy of fraternization and collaboration with the white-supremacist regimes, and of gradual withdrawal from Pan-Africanist circles, with characteristic tenacity and gusto.
 

It was this steady drift towards a policy of befriending white-supremacist Africa and deliberately antagonizing black Africa that - along with certain aspects of Dr. Banda's internal policy - precipitated the cabinet crisis of
September,1964,which I have described at length elsewhere.14

The expulsions and dismissals of the dissenting cabinet members, the flight into exile of these ministers and their supporters, and the extensive detention and mysterious disappearance of all other critics of the government, left Dr. Banda free to pursueh is southward-looking policies without fear of opposition. In 1966 he began having secret discussions with representatives of the South African regime. These talks culminated in March, 1967, in a goodwill mission to South Africa headed by the then Malawi Minister of Trade and Industry, J. T. Kumbweza, who was accompanied by two other cabinet members. The visit ended in the signing of the first trade agreement ever signed between the South African Government and an independent black African state. The agreement provided for increased trade between the two countries, financial and technical aid to Malawi, cultural exchanges, and the promotion of tourism. A little later another agreement was signed between Malawi and WENELA, permitting the latter to continue recruiting labor from Malawi.
 

Both agreements were renewals of expiring agreements previously signed between the South African Government and WENELA on the one hand, and the British Government in Malawi on the other. This led President Banda to claim that by signing the agreements he was merely carrying on a practice already firmly established and much too deeply rooted to be abolished without causing economic disaster in Malawi.15 Not only did the new agreements more deeply and inextricably commit Malawi to this inherited relationship but there is ample evidence that this action was not motivated by simple necessity or by fear of economic disaster.
 

In September, 1967, these links were further strengthened when Malawi became the first independent African state ever to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa. The time chosen by the Malawi Government for
announcing the event was symbolic, for the Organization of African Unity was then holding a meeting of heads of state in Kinshasa, Congo, a meeting which Malawi boycotted. It revealed more than anything else ever had that the southward- looking policy was to be pursued at the expense of African unity and that it aimed to embarrass and frustrate black Africa's aspirations. It is hardly surprising that the presidential address in which the announcement was made also denounced the OAU and stigmatized it as a body that indulges in "crying
for the moon."16
 

Finally, in May, 1970, Malawi became the first black African state to invite and receive a prime minister of white-supremacist South Africa as a state guest. Malawi women were ordered to dance and "rejoice" for the guest and he received a "hero's" welcome. At the official banquet given in honor of the guest, Prime Minister John Vorster, Dr. Banda, his body trembling with emotion, declared: "This is my finest hour. I have proved that in Africa Black and White can work and live together in harmony." He was apparently unable to remind himself that his guest was a man who was dedicated to the proposition that black and white cannot live and work together and was implementing policies of residential and occupational separation of black and white in South Africa with a fanatical zeal!
 

These have been the principal milestones in the development of close relations between South Africa and Malawi. But Vorster's visit to Malawi is by no means likely to be the last milestone. If the events and patterns of the past are anything to go by, we should expect more decisions and actions aimed at consolidating and enhancing these ties. It is not inconceivable, for instance, that a defense pact of some kind could be openly signed. (I say "openly" because such a possible accord has to be distinguished from a secret pact that, for some time, has been believed to exist. It is thought that by this secret pact South Africa would come to the assistance of the Malawi government in the event of an internal uprising. The pact is also alleged to provide for an exchange of intelligence.7 This secret accord as extended to Portugal and Rhodesia is also regarded by some to cover the eventuality of a jointly planned and jointly executed four-prongedin vasion of those black Africans tates which actively aid and harbor armed African nationalists fighting the South African, Portuguese,
and Rhodesian white-minority regimes.) Some sort of a federation or confederation linking Malawi with these minority regimes, in which South Africa would be the leading partner, has also been regarded as a possible distant goal of this friendship.
 

The Extent of South Africa's Presence in Malawi
 

How extensive is the South African political and economic presence in Malawi and how strong is the influence of South Africa on Malawi or of Malawi on South Africa?
 

First of all, in 1968, as stipulated by the trade agreement of March, 1967, Malawi received a loan of nearly $12 million from South Africa for building a new capital city near Lilongwe, close to Dr. Banda's home district and among his tribesmen. It was a plan against which Dr. Banda's economic experts had advised very strongly as being financially most unsound, extravagant and likely to discourage those who sympathized with Malawi's economic plight and wanted to offer help. All the traditional western supporters of Dr. Banda, including the U.S., Britain, and West Germany, had for similar reasons declined to provide a loan?8 But Dr. Banda had declared that if he could not get it from his friends he was going to get it from his "enemies" and had proceeded to seek it from the South African government.
 

In addition, South Africa gave Malawi a "soft" loan of $11 million for the construction of a railway line to the port of Nacala in northern Mozambique. This project is part of Dr. Banda's attempt to "free" Malawi from too much reliance on the Portuguese port of Beira and its access railway. But since Nacala is no less Portuguese-controlled than Beira it is difficult to understand how Malawi is being "freed" by the new port.
 

Further, in 1969 South Africa provided a loan for the construction of a new international airport near the site of the new capital.
 

South African private and philanthropic organizations have joined their government in working for the success, in Malawi, of Vorster's "outwardlooking" policy. The Beit Trust and WENELA are among the several nongovernmental bodies that have provided South African funds for building bridges, hospitals, schools, and welfare centers in Malawi.................................................

 Post to be continued

Footnote

A former Minister of Education in the Malawi government and leading personality in the Malawi Congress Party, Henry Chipembere is currently studying for his Ph. D. in African history at UCLA and teaching at California State College, Los Angeles.